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ABSTRACT
This article is a part of a research project entitled Law as Potency, that, 
broadly put, investigates the relation between law and ontology. I argue, 
starting from St. Paul, that an ontological perspective can be understood 
as the possibility of justice, in a sense of a liberation of the human being. 
Thus, this paper offers an analysis of the concepts of potency and 
universality. Even though the term ‘universalism’ is not explicitly mentioned, 
it is present in St. Paul’s thinking and brought onto its practical consequences. 
In addition, Spinoza’s reading of St. Paul opens up a possibility to challenge 
this concept to a concept of modern teleology. Therefore, I discuss the 
consequences of this confrontation in regard to law, politics and economics. 
This leads to an articulation of another modernity, where, perhaps, the 
universal appears as the affirmation of difference. 
1. Introduction
This article is a part of an ongoing research project Law as Potency that inves-
tigates the relationship between law and ontology, present in works of St. Paul, 
Spinoza, Deleuze, Agamben, Negri and Derrida. As a starting point, I offer a 
brief discussion on Paul and Spinoza.
When we take into consideration Paul’s work, it seems that, the possibility 
of justice could be understood in the sense of a general liberation of the hu-
man being. The concepts of potentiality and the universal appear throughout 
in a meaningful and explicit way. But the question is what kind of rupture does 
Christian thought provide in order to enable us to think on presence of meta-
physics in Paul? And, moreover, why, as we talk about a possible metaphysical 
rupture, we want to save ontology in Paul? Even though, the term itself is not 
mentioned, universalism is present within Paul’s thinking, and he brings it to 
its ultimate and practical consequences. Through the comparison and juxtapo-
sition of Paul’s Epistles and the works of contemporary philosophers devoted 
to the readings of his Epistles, I propose an ontological reinterpretation of the 
relation between law and justice, and of Right as potency.
On the other hand, we can ask ourselves why do we need to go back to Spi-
noza in order to discuss teleology, if modern teleology is much more explicit 
in Hegel. The answer to this question seems obvious: In order to understand 
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Spinoza’s thinking we need to start from teleology. Or, rather, everything that 
Spinoza champions seems to be a possibility of a confrontation of this con-
cept and the entire world that is grounded in it. So, the question of substance 
appears immediately, from the very beginnings of his philosophy, as well as 
the possibility to think the potentiality of substance as causa sui, as something 
that is not determined by any transcendental structure. Therefore, this paper 
explores the possibility of another modernity brought to the fore by Spino-
za: I give a certain advantage to an ontological interpretation of his thought 
 vis-à-vis the Western tradition, elaborating its consequences and political lim-
itations, as well. 
2. The Paul’s Ontology
It seems that metaphysics always went along with the history of philosophy: 
within the ancient Greek context, it unfolds itself as a question of the ground-
ing (die Erdung) of the world; in the modern context, it becomes the question 
of the subjective grounding of theory and practices. Even in the context of the 
discussions about the critique and possibilities of overcoming of metaphysics, 
it appears a rupture within the question on the new grounding that is directly 
connected to the question of our authenticity. Here, according to Heidegger, 
this rupture will be called ontology and not metaphysics. What we want in-
stead, therefore, is to grasp one possible ontology in St. Paul.
But, what any of this has to do with the readings of Paul’s Christianity? The 
term ontology is missing. Moreover, having in mind his unfortunate encoun-
ter with Greek philosophers, we can argue that regardless of our readings of 
St. Paul, none of them is going to be philosophical. Nobody understood no 
one during these encounters. But what seems to appear, though, is the ques-
tion concerning a possibility of Christian metaphysics. What kind of rupture 
do we have in Christian thought if we reconsider Paul’s metaphysics? And, 
moreover, why, discussing this possible metaphysical rupture, we want to save 
ontology at all costs?
Is there any possibility of bringing his position closer to the modern meta-
physical era? I argue that there is a notion of subjectivity in his thought, even 
though the question of subjectivity itself belongs to the late modernity. Not 
even Descartes discussed the matter. Taking this into account, isn’t it rath-
er obvious that we can interpret Paul not only as our contemporary, but as a 
modern thinker, too? 
Once again, is there a possibility to speak about ontology in his thinking? 
He, himself never uses this term, as mentioned previously. Nevertheless, I 
would like to trace back this absence and explore further the possibility of 
Paul’s ontology, following Heidegger, who indicates that ontology represents a 
critique of metaphysics, creating the rupture for the possibility of our authen-
ticity. Thus, would Paul be contemporaneous? Ultimately, he talks about the 
universalism, and, perhaps, this is the point where he goes beyond his time; 
perhaps he is our guide, telling us something about ourselves now. 
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In addition, what I would like to examine and scrutinize is whether the 
Paul’s thought has its practical consequences. At least, the Epistles indicate 
this much. Yet, how can we trust Paul’s politics if, for instance, even when 
condemning slavery, he does not invite us to overthrow it, but to stay passive? 
“Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called.” (1 Cor. 7:20)1 
Would be there, nevertheless, a political articulation that goes in this direc-
tion? Is Paul’s Amor Mundi a possibility? How can we offer a legal reading of 
this position? Paul dedicates many passages to discussion of justice and laws. 
Paul and metaphysics, Paul and Amor Mundi. Paul and the question of justice.
Let’s try to start from the beginning, yet again. Everything begins on his way 
to Damascus, when suddenly a heavenly light strikes him and Paul falls from 
his horse. Then he hears a voice: “Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?” 
And Paul asks back: “Who are thou, oh Lord?” And the answer was: “I’m Jesus, 
who you persecute”. This is, in sum, the very first conversion in Christianity. 
Saul will even change his name, and instead of the name of a great king of Jews 
(Saul), he will start presenting himself as Paul, as someone insignificant and 
worthless. This is the beginning of the one of the most important narratives 
of humankind; it departs from the Aramaic version, where he “starts speak-
ing Greek, penetrating definitively the Greco-Roman cultural world” (Holzner 
2008: 100) and arrives to us. As a project or a task, perhaps. 
2.1. Greeks and Christians 
But why should we follow Jesus? We already have Greek guidance. What is the 
point of questioning the Greek heritage? Ancient Greek metaphysics follows 
the world, not men, not even one man. The Greeks are humble; they want to 
understand the world and their very own place in it. But Paul is humble too; 
someone who thinks of himself as insignificant, as the change of names in-
dicates. Moreover, he puts all his hope in the perspective of following Jesus. 
“But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto 
the Greeks foolishness.” (1 Cor. 1:23) Or, speaking from the Christian standpoint: 
“For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God […]” (1 Cor. 3:19). The 
wisdom of the philosophers does not reveal the potentiality that is proper to 
man. Tied to wisdom until today, we remain bonded to what is given, and not 
to what the possible human world could be. For that reason, there shall be faith 
and not the shred of evidence related to wisdom. Therefore, to follow Jesus.
Of course, there is a difference between Greek and Christian receptions of 
metaphysics. For Greeks the search for the ground is the question of reason. 
Even Eros appears as an attempt of actualization, of fulfilment of oneself, per-
haps only cognitively. But reason appears as spiritless, as it is not the place of 
the encounter, of others. Paul, thus, found Athens cold, a place where no one 
understands him. That is why the Christian way differs: it is not about Eros, but 
about Agape; it is the path of love for the divine; it is an emotional relationship. 
1 All translations in English are mine, if not indicated differently.
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It is not the Reason, but the Spirit, Pneuma. Therefore, we can ask ourselves 
what could be the meaning of the Pneuma? This difference between Reason 
and Spirit will remain present for a very long time, inspiring Hegel’s philoso-
phy. But here, however, this difference is at the very beginning of the attempt 
of re-constructing Christianity. 
Why, again, follow Jesus? Adam, as we know, is the first man (ό προτος 
άνθροπος) and Jesus the second one (ό δεύτερος άνθροπος). But Adam is the first 
man on earth (ό προτος άνθροπος εκ γης) and Jesus the first of heaven (ό δεύτερος 
άνθροπος έκ ουρανού). Here, perhaps, there is the difference. Does the Spirit, 
Pneuma, has its distinctive mark only for being heavenly? This is, rather, com-
mon or too literal reading of the spiritual that appears to be something differ-
ent from the natural, something merely given. Thus, being of heavenly origin 
does not suffice to open the possibility of the spiritual. The Bible confirms 
this. The Spiritual happens with the resurrection. Only through it we can talk 
about Pneuma. Spirit is what makes life (πνεύμα ζωοποιυν). “For as in Adam all 
die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.” (1 Cor. 15:22)
In other words, not only to survive, but to accomplish something proper 
to the human, beyond the mere fact of being alive. “[… ] where the Spirit of 
the Lord is, there is liberty.” (2 Cor. 3:17) Thus, the Spirit is the possibility of 
Freedom. This is, perhaps, the meaning of human life. But how this can be ac-
complished? Everything is foretold and depends on praying? We only liber-
ate ourselves in the monasteries or only by following the religion? If Paul is at 
the beginning of Christianity, we need to know what has happened. Perhaps 
Christianity has not fulfilled itself yet. 
Perhaps not even through resurrection the Spirit fulfills itself. We need 
something more. An intrusion, perhaps. An intrusion from the very human 
being. For, only through intrusion the Spiritual may appear. It means that the 
Spiritual depends on the human being. Hegel follows this line of interpreta-
tion. Because, ultimately, resurrection is a gift of the divine and the Spiritu-
al is not only found in this gift, but in something that still needs to be done. 
Done by the human being, maybe? Maybe the Spiritual is the (only) possibility 
of the human? Is it Freedom, bounded to the Spiritual, still a possibility wait-
ing to happen? There are three essential parts of Christianity: the redemptive 
death, the resurrection and the return of the Holy Spirit. (Holzner 2008: 322.) 
When will Jesus come back? This is the question of Parousia, and maybe as 
such, it is the question of possibility or potentiality of the very human being. 
But, how to understand this potency? At this point I propose a different 
path: to follow the difference between law and justice; Right and the question 
of potency. In my opinion, this is a great message: Paul sees that the laws are 
unjust; they killed Jesus. So, the laws do not bind us to the possibility of our 
own potency. They connect us with objects. Or, rather, they connect our de-
sires to objects and express the conditions for their satisfaction. This is the 
meaning of the laws. They treat us almost like animals, as Hegel laments in 
the Phenomenology of the Mind. 
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Therefore, how to think the possibility of our assertion beyond this reifica-
tion? We are at the threshold or the beginnings of a possible Paul’s ontology. 
This ontology is marked by crucifixion. Or better, its beginning is in the cross. 
“For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to everyone that believeth.” 
(Rom. 10:4) Justice appears only beyond the laws; Justice outside the law, outlaw 
justice, as suggested by the brilliant interpretation of Theodore Jennings (2013.). 
2.2 Law and Justice
We need to closely examine this possibility. If, in the end of the laws stands 
the possibility of death, which, in fact, ensures them, we can expect a rein-
vention of life. If, the laws appear in relation to objects, from the ontological 
standpoint, the Others appear, too. This is, at least to the certain extent, the 
assertion (affirmation, contention) of (the) Others. Paul’s word for this asser-
tion is love: Love is the possibility of this ontological rupture, of this life in Je-
sus. “Love is the fulfilling of the law.” (Rom 13:10)
Hence, the possibility of justice does not stem from the laws. Paul does not 
identify justice with the laws, as it was the case until Cicero. Justice comes from 
the divine generosity, from this opening to Others, perhaps as slaves. “There 
is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male 
nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.” (Gal. 3:28) A promise of the uni-
versal that had never appeared as such before. “Justice is the affirmative expe-
rience of the arrival of the Other as Other”, contends Derrida (2002: 104). The 
assertion of the contingency of the Other. Therefore, it is called love and it is 
not some kind of rational procedure. 
Welcome Others! This is the message. Will it fulfill itself? What would be 
the messianic dimension of this opening and this politics? And why here, of all 
places, the potentiality of the very human being would appear? “For the Son 
of God, Jesus Christ, who was preached among you by us, even by me and Sil-
vanus and Timotheus, was not yea and nay, but in him was yea.” (2 Cor. 1:19) 
The performative Derridean ‘yes’ is clustered in this ontological opening; here 
the human being appears.
“For we are laborers together with God […]”. (1 Cor. 3:9) The project is ours. 
Yet, why God did not appear, for example, in Auschwitz? The answer is sim-
ple: because he is not responsible for evil. He cannot help us, but we need to 
help him. We are his co-workers (σύνεργοι). Weak, perhaps, without knowl-
edge, without support from the legal order. But in this weakness, Paul claims, 
in this determining absence of power, lays potency. “[…] Strength is made per-
fect in weakness.” (2 Cor. 12:9) And also: “[…] for when I am weak, then am I 
strong.” (2 Cor. 12:10)
Agamben will return to this revolutionary reading of the concept of potency 
in Aristotle (Caputo, Alcoff: 2009). The messianic is not the place of strength 
or power, but of weakness, that perhaps creates the world. In later readings, 
the concept of potency was almost lost. For instance, Thomas Aquinas, in his 
identification of essence and existence, sees potency in acts. According to him, 
STUDIES AND ARTICLES │ 89
there is no potency that does not fulfil itself. We will need to wait for Spino-
za to reinvent the concept of potency, connected to a metaphysical reading as 
well. In Paul, God waits for us to say “yes”, to hear the call and act (ibid: 156). 
There are no transcendental places that secure the way to the divine. Here, 
perhaps, we may talk about the immanence of the ontological way. 
And what is arriving? What the Parousia would be? The return of Jesus? 
“For all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this; Thou shalt love thy neigh-
bor as thyself.” (Gal. 5:14) But also: “[…] for he that loveth another hath fulfilled 
the law.” (Rom. 13:8) This is a direction that leads us to the core fundaments 
of the laws. “Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid: yea, 
we establish the law.” (Rom. 4:31) There is an acknowledgment of the law that 
can be justified. “Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, 
but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we 
might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law: for 
by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.” (Gal. 2:16) The law that ac-
knowledges itself is the law that justifies itself. The law can be legal, but unjust, 
even according to our ‘informal’ understanding. The law that is acknowledged 
here is the law that is bounded to justice. 
We may remind ourselves that, from modernity onwards, we acquired a pos-
itivistic perspective which dismisses the need for this legitimacy from justice. 
What matters is legality, to stay within a system. And this Paul’s justice, under-
stood here as an opening to the Other, is a sign, perhaps, of the possible democ-
racy. In the end, to study law is to understand its very own democratic postulates. 
This ontological opening, this assertion of the Other, is the question of 
justice, the postulate of the laws. Therefore, “we are no more strangers and 
foreigners, but fellow citizens with the saints, and of the household of God.” 
(Eph. 2:19) Co-citizens (συμπολίται) or citizens of the new world community 
bounded by mutual greets. 
3. Another Modernity
St. Paul provides us with the opportunity to understand the possibility of jus-
tice as the possibility of general liberation of human being. Potentiality and the 
universal explicitly appear. But the question is how this subject is addressed 
within the modern context? Or, differently: What is the potency of moderni-
ty and what can be universalized through it? Having these questions in mind, 
we can now turn to Spinoza. 
There is a Hegel’s remark that the Modernity accomplishes us and that it 
represents the fulfilment of freedom for all. The question is now why go back 
to Spinoza, if the modern responses became explicit only in/with Hegel? Af-
ter all, Hegel presents himself as a specific modern self-consciousness, as an 
elaboration of the truth of the modern world. Why, again, return to the ques-
tion that concerns the modern truth and, even more so, to the question of mo-
dernity itself via Spinoza? 
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Hegel gives credit to the works of Spinoza, first and foremost, for thinking 
the absolute (Hegel 1986: 157–197). However, for Hegel, Spinoza only thinks it 
as Substance, and not yet as a Subject, an error that, from Hegel’s standpoint, 
leaves room for many questions. What does this mean? Hegel’s critique un-
folds and becomes apparent when he discusses the consequences of the Spi-
noza’s position in relation to particular, concrete things. Hegel thinks that 
Spinoza misunderstood the concrete, that is, he understood only one dimen-
sion of it, showing its differences only in relation to other concrete entities. 
In other words, Spinoza understood only the negation related to the concrete, 
but not the double negation which involves the concrete in its own process of 
actualization. Therefore, Spinoza did not understand, according to Hegel, the 
possibility of overcoming the concrete, the negative, and of accomplishment 
of its own potentialities. Thus, the concrete, the particular, does not even ap-
pear. Everything would be encapsulated and lost in the metaphysical identity 
of the Substance. Life itself disappears in the name of this identity that, per-
haps, Spinoza only repeats. 
For Hegel, Spinoza only arrives at an elaboration of the world in rela-
tion to our understanding (Verstand), but not to our Reason (Vernunft) that 
would show the dialectical overcoming and the final accomplishment of the 
world. Understanding knows only the first negation, whereas Reason knows 
the process through which the negative is surpassed, meaning, it knows the 
process of the double negation. This negation of a negation, in Hegel, re-
mains related to the discussion of the possibility of the Subject. The Subject 
ultimately accomplishes something that nature cannot. When all is said and 
done, Spinoza had only the idea of Nature and not the idea of Subjectivity. 
And this Subjectivity, following Hegel, creates the conditions for mediation 
and change in the world. What appears here is, first, the possibility of the 
specific human world and second the endpoint of universal freedom for all. 
Therefore, Subjectivity and universal Freedom articulate the potentiality and 
the truth of the modern world. We have, thus, all reasons to remain linked 
to this modern project. 
Why, again, go back to Spinoza when modern teleology is clearly more ex-
plicit in Hegel? Here appears the term from which we can begin to understand 
Spinoza’s thinking: Teleology. Or, better, everything that Spinoza advances re-
garding the possibility of a conflict of this word and the world that is ground-
ed in it. The question of substance appears here, from the very beginning of 
his philosophy. Or, differently: to think the potentiality of substance as causa 
sui, as something that is not determined by any transcendental structure. The 
transcendental disappears in Spinoza, that is, there is a disappearance of all the 
traditional assumptions of philosophy, which includes, for example, the later 
assumptions of German idealism as well. The world is the affirmation of its 
own immanence and not the accomplishment of transcendental and/or tele-
ological structures. Hegel’s critique becomes very concrete, or better, includes 
the dialectical fulfilment, if seen as the affirmation of the Substance’s poten-
cy only. The concrete, thus, does not accomplish something beyond itself. In 
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other words, the concrete is the affirmation of this ontology of potency and 
not the deontology of the accomplishment of the transcendental. 
I will discuss further how this ontology seems to appear in Spinoza re-
garding the questions of law, politics, and economy. Within this context, what 
becomes apparent is a possibility for another modernity, or, for a world be-
yond modernity. From this perspective, we cannot forget the initial terms 
previously mentioned as essential to a discussion with Spinoza: potency and 
the universal. In this sense, a perspective to confront Hegel is now clearer – 
the question is: Is it possible to talk about the idea of the Subject along with 
Spinoza? Consequently, this is the point where Deleuze would pursue a Ni-
etzschean reading, to contest a particular Hegelian heritage in psychoanal-
ysis and to reinvent possibility of potentiality in the contemporary context 
(Deleuze 1962). 
3.1. Spinoza and Law
Let’s follow here the practical implications of Spinoza’s rupture with the meta-
physics of the transcendental. In the beginning there is a question on jus nat-
uralism articulated in the Theological-Political Treatise. The postulate of jus 
naturalism is the idea of nature related to natural rights, the social contract 
and the conditions of articulating the State. What Hobbes, Locke and Rous-
seau have in common is the notion of natural freedom that appears also as the 
difference between authoritarian, liberal and democratic State. Therefore, the 
question about jus naturalism articulates the possibility to reconstruct the his-
torical road of modernity. 
Whereas the German Idealism defies jus naturalism, something that already 
could be found in Kant’s difference between nature and freedom, Spinoza’s 
contesting entails a different relation between nature and freedom. Spinoza 
will go along the lines of the affirmation of the potentiality of being, which, as 
a consequence, is related to the human being and its practices. In other words, 
freedom will remain linked to nature and to a specific inclination towards the 
preservation of one’s own being. This is what Spinoza calls as conatus. This 
interpretation of the preservation of one’s own being resembles Hobbes. How-
ever, this reading is different. While in Hobbes the contract will require the 
abandonment of natural rights in favor of security in the authoritarian State, 
Spinoza opposes to this idea of contract. Following this line of inquiry, we 
will understand better the very place of the human being within the context 
or framework of immanence in nature.
“No one transfers his natural right to another” (2016: 287), says Spinoza, 
elaborating the conditions of coexistence within a society, “all remain equal, 
as they were before in the state of nature.” (ibid: 287) This is a point of de-
parture from Hobbes. In fact, Hobbes speaks about the conditions of securi-
ty that animate all contracts, creating the conditions for our survival. How-
ever, for Spinoza what is important isn’t survival. The point is “to liberate the 
individual from fear, so that he can live as much as possible in security, that 
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is, preserving as much as possible, and without damages to other, his natural 
right to exist and act.” (ibid: 347) In this sense, Spinoza brings together right 
and natural laws: Right is related to the ontology of being, and it represents 
an affirmation of being; it does not imply mere following of the given norms. 
Right, in this sense, is the concretization of this ontology of being.
3.2. Spinoza and Politics
What we can see is that it would not be any metaphysical stratum between 
nature and freedom, as in the Aristotelian or Hegelian interpretations. Hegel 
would agree with this critique of the social contract, for it requires a thinking 
of the dignity of the State as something independent of human decisions, as 
something that ends this historical teleology. But, for Spinoza, there is nothing 
final here: The State accomplishes only its own nature. Therefore, the finality 
of the State can only be freedom (ibid: 347). 
Modernity did not abandon the metaphysics of identity manifested in our 
knowledge. We can draw a line from Hobbes to Hegel. This identity has a te-
leological sense, in accordance with the lines of interpretation of nature in 
Hobbes, or the Spirit in Hegel. It seems that within the Spinoza’s dispute with 
this modern teleology or this modern identity, we can look for a possibility of 
another modernity, where human being could be understood not as deficien-
cy, but as potentiality. 
Here we arrive at the issue concerning a possible Subjectivity in Spinoza 
and the question of democracy. As we have seen, Spinoza’s metaphysics indi-
cates the affirmation of immanence in being. Yet, if everything would be the 
process of immanence, there wouldn’t be any necessity for us to do anything 
whatsoever. That is, anything beyond contemplating of the world. On the con-
trary, we are witnesses of the powers which do not affirm any potency. Would 
capitalism be the example of the immanence of being? In this sense, we need 
to know what are the principles (arche) of our world, so that we can follow the 
way of immanence. Hence, Spinoza’s Ethics is a continuation of the readings 
on Physics. The Ethics follows the process of affirmation announced at the be-
ginning of his metaphysics (Deleuze 1968: 251). Knowledge brings us closer to 
the understanding of the structure of being, to the possibility of agreeing with 
nature. How can we understand this? One possible answer is – through the 
question of democracy.
“As men are subjected to passions, one cannot say that they agree in na-
ture”. (Spinoza 2018: 32) What we see here, in fact, is the matter of reason in 
Spinoza. Reason is no more representative (element) as in Aristotle, nor con-
stitutive, as in Hegel. Reason simply speaks to us, asking us to comply with 
nature. “Only as men live through the conduct of reason, men agree, always 
and necessarily, in nature.” (ibid: 35) In Corollary 1, Spinoza points out that the 
thing most useful to man, among singular things, can only be a man that lives 
on the condition of reason (ibid: 35). That is, ‘there isn’t anything more useful 
to man, between the singular things, than a man.” (ibid: 35)
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This intersubjectivity, that appears when Spinoza speaks of multitude, is a 
possible dimension of subjectivity in his philosophy. It starts with the idea of 
conatus. Thus, subjectivity is not transcendental or constitutive; it expresses 
and articulates itself in a relation, therefore, Subjectivity in Spinoza is rela-
tional. Or, as Balibar argues, the condition of the subject in Spinoza has as its 
ground in the conditions of coexistence with others, of citizenship which de-
velops itself in the democratic State (Balibar 2005: 45). Democracy is, there-
fore, a project which agrees with nature. In other words, it is the immanence 
of nature. This is why we can say that Spinoza is not so much a thinker of dif-
ference; he is the thinker of the possibility of the understanding of immanence. 
Through the agreement with nature, we arrive at the universal dimension of 
democracy; to the common, not the public world. So, Spinoza is the thinker 
of the common world, not the public one. This difference between the com-
mon and public becomes clearer through the reconstruction of the problems 
of the economy in Spinoza.
3.3. Spinoza and Economy
In order to shed some light on the problems of economy we will start with Marx, 
who will search the truth of the modern world in the economy. According to 
him there is nothing more profound for understanding of modernity than the 
economy. Or differently, we cannot go beyond the conflictual relation between 
capital and labor to understand our world. The modern truth is economical; 
in the background of modernity stands economy. 
Now, Spinoza dedicates only a couple of lines to the discussion of econo-
my. On the final pages of the Ethics, the book IV, he writes: “But money has 
furnished us with a token for everything: hence it is with the notion of mon-
ey, that the mind of the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardly con-
ceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the idea of money 
as cause.” (Spinoza 2018) Can we say, then, that Spinoza understood moder-
nity as undervaluing the economy? Is it possible to do such a thing? If this is 
true, how can we bring Spinoza and Marx closer? In order to address this is-
sue, we need to return to the text that perhaps inspired Spinoza, namely Ar-
istotle’s Politics, chapter III. 
For Aristotle economy stays within the private sphere (it concerns domestic, 
household affairs), and, as such, it has nothing to with the public one. Also, for 
the Greeks economy was not an ontological question. Maybe, we are about to 
face a problem in their thinking: the problem of ontology and economy. May-
be the relation between ontology and economy could be seen only as modern 
one, as utterly Marx’s realm, for he was the first one to grasp it? 
Going back to Aristotle, we can ask ourselves why he dedicates one of the 
first chapters of his Politics to the economy, if economy remains irrelevant for 
his thought? There is a type of art of acquisition “which by nature is a part of 
the management of a household” (or domestic economy, [Politics, 1256b: 1997]). 
For us, this is not a problem at all. Ultimately, not even for Marx, even though 
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he criticizes the economy as such (the Greek economy, for instance). The point 
of his critique is the question of economy in modernity. Maybe Aristotle al-
ready got close to this kind of reading. There is, as we have seen, an art of ac-
quisition which is ‘natural’, “given by nature” (to use Aristotle’s expression), 
and that plays its part in “the satisfaction of the proper necessities of man” 
(1257a). But there is another way of wealth acquisition, contrary to nature, re-
lated only to money, an art, if we may say so, of wealth-getting. (1257b) Here, 
richness is the goal and not the natural teleology. The economy that departs 
from this natural teleology creates certain risks. Aristotle claims: “Hence usury 
is very justifiably detested, since it gets wealth from money itself rather than 
from the very thing money was devised to facilitate.” (1258b), that is, the nat-
ural necessities. And he concludes: “Hence of all the kinds of wealth acquisi-
tion this one is the most unnatural.” (1258b) That is why he even uses another 
word, Chrematistics, to emphasize the difference between the economy given 
by nature from its not-natural counterpart.
What Spinoza criticizes, in the passage commented earlier, is the econo-
my that became Chrematistics in the modern epoch. For him, the economy is 
not that much of the importance, because he does not let social reproduction 
to be bounded to an identity, in this case to the economic one. At this point, 
maybe we can argue, along with Spinoza, for the common and not the public, 
because the public arises from the modern affirmation of economy. Common 
world  should be the affirmation of potentiality, of plurality, and not some-
thing related to the teleological reproduction of identities. 
It becomes clearer why Spinoza does not belong to the liberalism and the 
economical roads of modernity, nor republicanism: He confronts the modern 
idea of the teleology of the State, which finds its ultimate consequences in Hegel. 
Following this line of argumentation, Marx will claim that we cannot ac-
complish universality in modernity. Modernity is the conflict between capital 
and labor, and not the possibility to overcome an accomplishing of the affir-
mation of universal. The truth of the modern world is not universal, but a mere 
abstraction. Since the beginnings of modernity, labor is transformed from a 
standpoint of capital to a standpoint of abstract value of exchange, not even 
the concrete value of (some) use. For Marx this transformation of labor to cap-
ital is a sign that we cannot conquer the universal in modernity. 
4. Concluding remarks
Parousia, therefore, is the invitation for a change, for a mutual recognition 
with/of Others. The divine gift is a possibility, an invitation of/for this change. 
Parousia concretizes itself in a universal and messianic community. Politics is 
not grounded in the identities of a social and legal community. (Arendt comes 
to mind along with Paul following the idea of Amor Mundi).
What is at the bottom of politics? Differences? Differences quite often re-
sult in creating new identities. The debates on sex and gender show us at least 
that much: Each party defends its own truth. But, if truth exists, it must be 
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universal. This is the point of Badiou’s reading of Paul (2009). Therefore, the 
alternative to identity politics is not difference, but the universal; the possi-
bility of being to be treated as a human being.
But what about the question of the universal in Paul, when it seems that he 
disputes Jews, Greeks, and Romans alike? He is against Jewish legalism, Greek 
reason, and the Roman imperial power. Thus, what could be universal in this 
context? Perhaps the universal is in this militancy, in this confrontation with 
the identities and this possibility of opening for the others. An explicit mili-
tancy, it seems, because the world of Paul was a world of slaves.
Martin Scorsese’s movie The Silence offers us a useful illustration: Why the 
Christian missionaries go to Japan? Nobody wants them there. The Japanese, 
from their side, do not send missionaries to conquer the souls of Europeans. 
Thus, all sympathies are on their side. If we support this line of thinking, how 
can we defend the universal, of Christianity presented in Pauline readings? It 
could mean: To save Japan from suffering, and social exclusion, to affirm the 
Other, to affirm Change, and to be free (Beings). “Stand fast therefore in the 
freedom wherewith Christ hath made us free.” (Gal. 5:1) Or: “[…] where the 
Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom.” (2 Cor. 4:17)
Therefore, Amor Mundi manifests itself as love for freedom. The resurrec-
tion of Christ, a singular event, appears as universal, as the possibility of (for) 
humankind. The Pauline universal, thus, represents a specific connection be-
tween the singular and the universal. This is the message we receive and it is 
much stronger in the face of the neoliberal culture of new identities, which ex-
cludes life and the others in the name of the market. Is there anyone who feels 
alive in Capitalism? We, the zombies of globalization. Maybe this resembles 
a draft of Pasolini’s movie, which he never made, that places Paul not in Gali-
lee, Attica, and Lazio, but somewhere between Europe and the United States.
In the epistle to the Galatians, Paul contends: “For in Christ Jesus neither 
circumcision means anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature.” (Gal. 
6:15) This is a quasi-Nietzschean message. Nietzsche is the one who did not 
understand Paul because of the recurring question of universalism. For Ni-
etzsche, Christianity, even the Pauline one, is a form of a cultural nihilism. 
Contrary to Nietzsche, the new being, claims Paul, is the rupture in the very 
being, so Christianity may yet happen.
We see, from the beginning, that Paul confronts the Jewish, Roman, and 
Greek orders. This represents an opening to/for our potentiality: the creation 
of another world. On the one hand, I understand Paul as a forerunner of the 
process of the destruction of metaphysics. This destruction remains a contem-
porary project. It also seems to be a possibility of understanding the relation-
ship between right and its principles, between laws and justice. 
On the other hand, Spinoza still seems to believe in universal, thinking about 
democracy and not revolution. But, arguing with Spinoza, we need to act here 
and now, in the empirical-transcendental sense, as Deleuze would say, instead 
of waiting for the teleological possibility of a subjectivity that, perhaps, may 
never accomplish itself. Indeed, this is the reality of the working class today. 
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Perhaps there are no more subjects, as Deleuze claims, following Spinoza, but 
only anonymous forces linked to individuals (Deleuze 1981: 172). 
“To become what one is” is the Nietzschean message that Deleuze follows. 
Return to oneself, beyond all teleologies. And affirm our own desire, which 
does not have its object. The project, therefore, begins with the affirmation 
of the concrete, then follows the framework of ontological immanence. Here, 
perhaps, we can read Marx and Spinoza alongside one another, on the issue 
of the confrontation of the reification of desire in the modern world (Lordon 
2015). Even practical struggles, according to Deleuze, should not articulate a 
dialectical negation, in Hegelian or Marxian sense, but entail a return to “dif-
ference and its potency of affirmation.” (Deleuze 1988: 935) This affirmation 
of the concrete, the Deleuzian project of the empirical-transcendental affirma-
tion, might be the possibility of another modernity that starts with Spinoza.
This affirmation of difference could create a context for thinking of the 
very idea of the universal to which Spinoza was committed. At the end of the 
Political Treatise, Spinoza asks: “whether it is by nature or by convention that 
women are subject to men. For if this is due solely to convention, I have ex-
cluded women from the government without any reasonable cause. However, 
if we consult actual experience, we shall see that it is due to their weakness.” 
(Spinoza 1983) And he concludes that: “we shall easily see that it is impossi-
ble for men and women to govern on equal terms without great damage to 
the peace.” (ibid) From this standpoint, along with Spinoza and against him, 
Deleuze will begin his project of becoming-woman. The universal appears, 
therefore, as the affirmation of difference. What is affirmed, thus, can become 
our common ground of immanence, or our equality.
translated by Ricardo Martins Spindola Diniz
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Ius sive Potentia: Pavle i Spinoza
Apstrakt
Ovaj članak je deo istraživačkog projekta pod nazivom Zakon kao potencija, koji, u širem smi-
slu, istražuje odnos prava i ontologije. Tvrdim, polazeći od Sv. Pavla, da se ontološka per-
spektiva može shvatiti kao mogućnost pravde, u smislu oslobađanja ljudskog bića. Stoga ovaj 
rad nudi analizu koncepata potencije i univerzalnosti. Iako termin „univerzalizam“ nije izričito 
pomenut, on je prisutan u mišljenju Sv. Pavla i doveden do svojih praktičnih posledica. Pored 
toga, Spinozino čitanje Sv. Pavla otvara mogućnost da se ovaj koncept iskuša konceptom 
moderne teleologije. Stoga raspravljam o posledicama ovog sučeljavanja u pogledu zakona, 
politike i ekonomije. To dovodi do artikulacije druge modernosti, gde se, možda, univerzalno 
pojavljuje kao afirmacija razlike.
Ključne reči: Sv. Pavle, Spinoza, potencija, ontologija, univerzalizam  
